This article provides a snapshot of two recent decisions from the Federal Court of Australia applying disability discrimination laws in 2025.

The Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) operates to provide protections to those living with disabilities in Australia in a number of areas of public life including employment and in the provision of goods and services.

Where a complaint of disability discrimination cannot be resolved in the Australian Human Rights Commission, the complainant can then proceed to the federal court system for judicial determination.

The recent decisions of the Federal Court of Australia discussed below highlight the diverse protections of the DDA, common difficulties in establishing liability and strategies available to stop discriminatory conduct on an interim basis.

Assistance animals and difficulty establishing the necessary causal link

Reurich v Savills (SA) Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 420 (Reurich)

The decision in Reurich highlights the difficulty of establishing the necessary causal link between disability and the conduct of the discriminator.

Mr Reurich’s complaint hinged on the asserted discriminatory conduct of a security guard based at his local shopping centre in the New South Wales town of Taree. Mr Reurich asserted that he had been unlawfully banned from the shopping centre on multiple occasions because of interactions the security guard had had with Mr Reurich’s assistance dogs Boofhead and later, Mr Bojangles. Mr Reurich was banned from the shopping centre after filming the security guard on multiple occasions, including in association with an attempt to serve legal documentation on him.

The DDA provides protections for persons who have assistance animals from discrimination, recognising the essential role that assistance animals can play in assisting persons with disabilities to navigate public life. For the purposes of the DDA, an assistance animal is a dog or other animal legally accredited to assist a person with a disability to alleviate the effect of a disability, or accredited by a prescribed animal training organisation, or trained to assist the person with a disability to alleviate the effect of the disability and to meet standards of hygiene and behaviour that are appropriate for an animal in a public place.

Mr Reurich argued (among other things) that in being banned from the shopping centre he was subjected to indirect and direct discrimination on account of his disability and / or him having an assistance animal.

It was not disputed in this instance that Mr Reurich had a disability within the meaning of the DDA, and he provided evidence that he lived with anxiety, autism, depression, panic attacks and post-traumatic stress disorder. It was also accepted that Mr Reurich’s first dog Boofhead was an assistance animal within the meaning of the DDA in circumstances where he was trained to assist him to alleviate the effect of the disability and meet the relevant hygiene and behaviour standards.

Consideration was given by the Court of Mr Reurich’s primary claim of direct disability discrimination, including the requirement for him to establish that he was the subject of treatment that was less favourable than the discriminator would treat a person without the disability in circumstances which were not materially different (this is the concept of the “comparator”).

While the Court identified that the appropriate comparator would be a person who frequented the shopping centre who does not “have, had, may or is imputed to have an assistance animal” or a mental health disorder, it could not be established that Mr Reurich was treated less favourably than the comparator. This finding was made in circumstances where Mr Reurich was banned from the premises for repeatedly filming the security guard. Filming was banned at the shopping centre, and it was standard practice that shoppers were told to desist from filming or they would be banned.

Ultimately, the evidence did not establish that Mr Reurich was banned from the shopping centre by reason of his disabilities or by reason of him having an assistance animal.

Interim injunction granted in disability discrimination dispute

Seniors and Disabilities Best Access Group v Commissioner of Main Roads [2025] FCA 424 (Seniors)

The decision in Seniors demonstrates the range of remedies available to cease discriminatory conduct, including through injunctive relief available from the time of making a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission.

The decision related to the construction of a new roundabout and the associated roadworks in Joondanna, a suburb in Western Australia. The proposed works included the removal of a bus stop and footpaths. It was asserted by the applicant, that the works would constitute indirect disability discrimination as they would limit access and increase risk for those living with disabilities. Specifically, it was contended that the position at which the new footpath would terminate, would make it unsafe, for members to cross the road, due to blind spots, and those individuals would be required to avoid using the footpath.

Indirect disability discrimination occurs when a seemingly neutral requirement or condition applies to the disadvantage of a person with a disability.

In this instance, the Applicant’s disability access group sought an interim injunction, available under laws that maintain the status quo as it existed immediately before the complaint was lodged to the Australian Human Rights Commission.

The application for the interim injunction sought to restrict roadworks, construction on a roundabout and the removal of the footpath. The Court considered well-established tests associated with granting an interim injunction, being whether there is a ‘serious question to be tried’ and where the ‘balance of convenience lies’.

An initial difficulty for the Court was the partially completed status of the works, meaning that little remained of the ‘status quo’ that existed before the complaint was lodged. The Court did find that the balance of convenience favoured completion of the roadworks and roundabout at the intersection as it was too late and there was no justification for preventing completion of those components of the works. It would also result in significant continuing and unnecessary inconvenience to members of the public.

However, the Court did acknowledge that the existing footpath had not been removed and was part of the pre-complaint status quo that remained capable of preservation. An interim injunction was accordingly granted for an initial 28-day period restraining the removal of the existing footpath to allow for the complaint-making and resolution process of the Australian Human Rights Commission to take place.

In the first instance, the Court granted the interim injunction.

The interim injunction was subsequently revised after 28 days at which time the Court discharged the injunction on the balance of convenience, taking into account evidence that:

1. the Australian Human Rights Commission was likely going to take several more months to reach a resolution;
2. during this time, the road and surrounding areas would remain a construction site which would pose a public risk;
3. it would be costly for the respondents to maintain a safe construction site for that prolonged period of time;
4. the area would be inaccessible to the public; and
5. if the proposed works were completed, this would eliminate the possibility of the Commission reaching any resolution.

The decision highlights the unique ability to seek injunctive relief from an early stage in making a complaint in the Australian Human Rights Commission.

This article was written by Lily Schafer-Gardiner, Special Counsel, and Trish Nguyen, Law Graduate, and reviewed by Brad Swebeck, Partner.